Autori
Acocella, Nicola
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni

Titolo
A simple framework for investigating the properties of policy games
Periodico
Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" - Dipartimento di Studi Geoeconomici, Linguistici, Statistici e Storici per l'Analisi regionale. Working papers
Anno: 2010 - Fascicolo: 67 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 20

The paper extensively studies the static model of non-cooperative linear quadratic games in which a set of agents chooses P:-strategically- their instruments (strategically to minimize their linear quadratic criterion). We first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium as well as for multiple equilibria to arise. Furthermore, we study the general condition for policy neutrality and Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium by introducing a new concept of decisiveness.




Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)