Autore
Saglam, Ismail

Titolo
Self-regulation under asymmetric cost information
Periodico
Economia e politica industriale
Anno: 2022 - Volume: 49 - Fascicolo: 2 - Pagina iniziale: 335 - Pagina finale: 368

In this paper, we study how a monopolistic firm with unknown costs may behave under the threat of regulation. To this aim, we integrate the self-regulation model of Glazer and McMillan (Q J Econ 107(3):1089–1099, 1992) with the optimal regulatory mechanism devised by Baron and Myerson (Econometrica 50(4):911–930, 1982) for the case of asymmetric information. Simulating the equilibrium outcome of our integrated model for a wide range of parameter values, we show among many results that the firm threatened with regulation always constrains its price; moreover, the price the firm charges under the threat of regulation can be even lower than the price it has to charge when it is regulated.



SICI: 0391-2078(2022)49:2<335:SUACI>2.0.ZU;2-5

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)

Biblioteche ACNP che possiedono il periodico