Autori
Delbufalo, Emanuela
Monsurrò, Marina

Titolo
Asymmetric information in subcontracting decisions: the effects of the first mover advantage
Periodico
Sinergie
Anno: 2019 - Volume: 37 - Fascicolo: 110 - Pagina iniziale: 87 - Pagina finale: 107

Purpose of the paper: The article analyses, in an adverse selection set-up, the effects of the first mover advantage in subcontracting decision between a manufacturer and a supplier in the situation of asymmetric information. Methodology: The study proposes a game theory model to analyze a supply chain consisting of a single risk-neutral supplier and a single risk-neutral manufacturer facing a contract definition problem. Results: The model suggests the strategies to obtain a more convenient arrangement for the manufacturer both in screening and signaling framework. Research limitations: The empirical examination with real-life data needs to be expanded and performed in a cross-sector context. Practical implications: The model helps the manufacturer in designing the appropriate arrangement for subcontracting relations and extracting hidden information from the suppliers. Originality of the paper: Our approach provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the effects of the first mover advantage in manufacturer-supplier relationships.



SICI: 0393-5108(2019)37:110<87:AIISDT>2.0.ZU;2-P
Testo completo: https://ojs.sijm.it/index.php/sinergie/article/view/762/262

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