Titolo Le gare e i contratti di servizio nel trasporto pubblico locale Periodico Economia dei servizi Anno: 2008 - Volume: 3 - Fascicolo: 1 - Pagina iniziale: 99 - Pagina finale: 113
This paper analyses the relationship between the service contract (and tender) design and the outcome of the tender in the local public tran sport. Data are collected through a survey involving about 50 territorial entities. It emerges that optimal contract (and tender) design crucially depends on the objective function of the regulator. Participation is encouraged by a semi-rigid model, by gross cost contracts, by weak incentives and by opportunity of sub-contracting. Vice versa, rebates are favoured by long duration of the contract, by strong incentives and (again) by opportunity for sub-contracting. Finally, having a new winner is favoured by strong incentives, by asset availability.