Autore
Hammond, Peter J.

Titolo
Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons
Periodico
European University Institute of Badia Fiesolana (Fi). Department of Economics - Working papers
Anno: 1990 - Fascicolo: 5 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 30

Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social choice depend only on personal rather than interpersonal comparisons of relevant social states, and so leads to dictatorship. Instead, a new “independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons” (IIIC) condition allows anonymous Paretian social welfare functionals such as maximin and Sen’s “leximin,” even with an unrestricted preference domain. But when probability mixtures of social states are considered, even IIIC may not allow escape from Arrow’s impossibility theorem for individuals’(ex-ante) expected utilities. Modifying IIIC to permit dependence on interpersonal comparisons of relevant probability mixtures allows Vickrey-Harsanyi utilitarianism.



Testo completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/344

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