Autore: Palmira, Michele
Titolo: Is Rational Disagreement in Philosophy Possible?
Periodico: Iride
Anno: 2014 - Volume: 73 - Fascicolo: 3 - Pagina iniziale: 595 - Pagina finale: 614

The aim of this paper is to illuminate some epistemic aspects of philosophical disagreement. A form of skepticism about philosophy is analyzed. This skepticism hinges on the idea that widespread and systematic disagreement in philosophy motivates the contention that philosophical beliefs are largely irrational. A consequence of this skeptical argument is that philosophers should resolve their disagreements by suspending judgement. I argue that this form of skepticism rests on a wrongheaded conception of the rationality of philosophical beliefs. Once a more appropriate notion of rationality is put forward, it is possible to avoid skepticism about philosophy and claim that rational disagreement in philosophy is possible.




SICI: 1122-7893(2014)73:3<595:IRDIPP>2.0.ZU;2-J
Testo completo: http://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1414/78396
Testo completo alternativo: http://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1414/78396

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