Autore: Kusch, Martin
Titolo: Wittgenstein e l'epistemologia del disaccordo
Periodico: Iride
Anno: 2014 - Volume: 73 - Fascicolo: 3 - Pagina iniziale: 555 - Pagina finale: 576

My main aim in this paper is to initiate a dialogue between Wittgenstein and present-day social epistemology on the issue of religious disagreement. I will use the contemporary discussions to reconstruct Wittgenstein's position on religious disagreement and, at the same time, I will try to indicate where Wittgenstein differs from well-known positions in this discourse. I will argue for four interpretative theses. First, Wittgenstein insists that the religious believer has extraordinary belief attitudes; second, he deems full disclosure of evidence for extraordinary beliefs impossible; third, faced with an epistemic peer who holds extraordinary beliefs, Wittgenstein opts neither for suspension of judgments nor for demotion of the religious believer's epistemic credentials; and fourth, he leans towards a form of relativism.




SICI: 1122-7893(2014)73:3<555:WELDD>2.0.ZU;2-Z
Testo completo: http://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1414/78394
Testo completo alternativo: http://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1414/78394

Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)

Biblioteche ACNP che possiedono il periodico