Autori
Acocella, Nicola
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
Hughes Hallett, Andrew

Titolo
Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations
Periodico
Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" - Dipartimento di Studi Geoeconomici, Linguistici, Statistici e Storici per l'Analisi regionale. Working papers
Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 46 - Pagina iniziale: 1 - Pagina finale: 17

This paper shows the relationship between static controllability (the well-known Tinbergen golden rule), and the existence and other properties of the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic setting with rational expectations for future behavior. We show how to determine the existence of equilibrium outcomes; the conditions under which no equilibrium exists; and who will get to dominate (or who will find their policies to have become ineffective) in those equilibria, without having to compute and enumerate all the possible equilibria directly.



Testo completo: http://geostasto.eco.uniroma1.it/utenti/acocella/english/93%20WPaper_%20No_46.pdf

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